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There is a broad theoretical and empirical interest in spontaneous mimicry, or the
automatic reproduction of a model’s behavior. Evidence shows that people mimic
models they like, and that mimicry enhances liking for the mimic. Yet, there is
no satisfactory account of this phenomenon, especially in terms of its functional
significance. While affiliation is often cited as the driver of mimicry, we argue that mimicry
is primarily driven by a learning process that helps to produce the appropriate bodily and
emotional responses to relevant social situations. Because the learning process and
the resulting knowledge is implicit, it cannot easily be rejected, criticized, revised, and
employed by the learner in a deliberative or deceptive manner. We argue that these
characteristics will lead individuals to preferentially mimic ingroup members, whose
implicit information is worth incorporating. Conversely, mimicry of the wrong person
is costly because individuals will internalize “bad habits,” including emotional reactions
and mannerisms indicating wrong group membership. This pattern of mimicry, in turn,
means that observed mimicry is an honest signal of group affiliation. We propose that
the preferences of models for the mimic stems from this true signal value. Further,
just like facial expressions, mimicry communicates a genuine disposition when it is
truly spontaneous. Consequently, perceivers are attuned to relevant cues such as
appropriate timing, fidelity, and selectivity. Our account, while assuming no previously
unknown biological endowments, also explains greater mimicry of powerful people, and
why affiliation can be signaled by mimicry of seemingly inconsequential behaviors.
Keywords: mimicry, imitation, contagion, social learning, implicit knowledge, socialization, non-verbal behavior
INTRODUCTION
Science knows many facts about spontaneous mimicry – the unintentional reproduction of
model’s behaviors, including gestures, postures, facial expressions, accents, and mannerisms. Yet,
a functional explanation of this phenomenon is still elusive. Here we argue that, just like other
forms of imitation, spontaneous mimicry primarily serves to acquire appropriate actions and
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reactions, including emotional responses, but in an implicit
fashion (see Kavanagh, 2015 for initial formulation). We
argue that several puzzling features of spontaneous mimicry
derive from this learning function, including mimicy’s
unconscious nature, its moderation by group membership
and liking, models’ positive response to mimicry, mimicry’s
low-fidelity, and its seemingly strategic use. Before discussing
our account, we briefly review core empirical findings and
theories.
HUMAN MIMICRY: SIX CORE
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND SOME
DISTINCTIONS
Research has discovered several features of mimicry (Chartrand
and Lakin, 2013). First, it is implicitly produced and perceived.
That is, individuals do not notice when they mimic others, or
when others mimic them, and have limited conscious control,
even with economic incentives (Belot et al., 2013). Second,
individuals like those who mimic them (Chartrand and Bargh,
1999). Third, individuals mimic people they know and like,
as when subjects imitate friends more than strangers (e.g.,
McIntosh, 2006). Fourth, individuals mimic outgroup members
less or even do the opposite. For example, in competitive situations
participants scowl to competitors’ smiles, just as quickly as they
smile to teammates’ smiles (Lanzetta and Englis, 1989; Carr et al.,
2014).
There are also puzzling aspects of spontaneous mimicry.
One is that despite its implicit nature, it can be seemingly
strategic. For example, an earlier failure to affiliate with
one person spurs participants toward increased mimicry
in a subsequent interaction with another person, especially
when participants had an initial goal to affiliate (Lakin and
Chartrand, 2003; see also Thelen et al., 1980; Wang and
Hamilton, 2012). Additionally, mimicry is subtle, approximate
(low-fidelity), and timing-dependent. For example, blatant,
exact (high-fidelity), or ill-timed mimicry typically backfires
(e.g., Parrill and Kimbara, 2006; Ashton-James et al., 2007).
Finally, mimicry can be triggered by relatively simple
features of gestures and expressions, and thus elicited even
by artificial agents (Bailenson and Yee, 2005; Hofree et al.,
2014).
Some distinctions are important here. People spontaneously
mimic movements, gestures, postures, and affective expressions.
Clearly, forms of imitation differ. For example, rapid mimicry
of finger movements involves simple matching of overtly
visible actions, whereas mimicry of emotional expressions
may also involve matching of correlated underlying states.
However, our short piece will treat these phenomena as
similar as they could all fulfill the functional role we assign
to mimicry. Still, we recognize that our claims may be
most applicable to affective mimicry, just because affect and
emotions are most reflecting of preferences and values. Finally,
it is worth remembering that not all implicit coordination
phenomena involve mimicry and thus may require separate
analysis.
EXTANT ACCOUNTS OF SPONTANEOUS
MIMICRY: WHAT IS THE PRIMARY
FUNCTION?
Several functional accounts of spontaneous mimicry have been
proposed. All offer useful insights into possible functions, but
struggle to accommodate some of the empirical facts discussed
earlier. Here we mention a few accounts, though our abbreviated
presentation does not capture their complexity. Our goal here
is highlight the need for another type of functional explanation,
which we propose shortly.
One class of accounts emphasizes mimicry’s function
for learning, coordination and synchrony, underpinned by
ideomotor mechanisms linking perception and action (e.g.,
Chartrand and Bargh, 1999; Preston and de Waal, 2002; Heyes,
2011). These accounts are elegant, yet they do not easily
accommodate findings showing modulation by liking, strategic
mimicry, and anti-mimicry of outgroup members. Lakin et al.
(2003) agree that mimicry was originally an evolved learning
mechanism, but later came to be a sort of “social glue” because
it demonstrated similarity to others. This view of mimicry as
an outward demonstration of “alikeness” is shared by Over
and Carpenter (2012), who hold that the ability for mimicry
to gain the favor of others is due to a biological disposition
toward liking others who are like us. Supporting this view is
evidence, for example, that participants are more attracted to
others whose experimental code numbers share digits with
their own birthdays (Jones et al., 2004). Note, however, that
many cases of spontaneous mimicry cannot be explained as
attempts to elicit the impression of similarity. For example,
less powerful individuals mimic the more powerful individuals,
but such mimicry actually signals differences in power, rather
than similarity (Over and Carpenter, 2015). Also, as mentioned,
mimicry tends to be imprecise, but the similarity account would
suggest higher effectiveness of high-fidelity mimicry.
Wang and Hamilton (2012) posit a sophisticated process in
their theory of Machiavellian mimicry. It suggests that people
strategically exploit mimicry to achieve their affiliation goals and
advance social standing with a model. This theory has trouble
with unconscious aspects of mimicry. More problematically,
it implies asymmetric levels of rationality between the mimic
(who is smart) and the model (who is fooled) in an extended
Machiavellian arms race. That is, if mimicry is Machiavellian,
then why should models respond positively to it in the long
run? The same concern applies to the idea that mimicry exploits
an innate attraction to similar others. If mimicry only indicates
surface similarity, then the long-term wisdom of affiliating with
mimics is questionable.
THE CURRENT PROPOSAL
The current proposal, like the above accounts, assumes that
mimicry solves a problem, and that there are mechanistic
constraints on possible solutions. However, unlike previous
accounts, we emphasize the functionality (i.e., ecological
rationality) of both mimicry and model’s affiliation with mimics –
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that is, we seek to satisfy criteria of “symmetric functionality”
of mimicry and affiliative responses to it. Further, we aim to
make the account as parsimonious as possible. In fact, we do not
posit any special skills beyond the capacity to link perception
and action and modify these links based on environmental
reward structures (Heyes, 2011). We believe that the problem
that spontaneous mimicry primarily solves is, like other forms
of imitation, a need to learn group- and environment-specific
skills and actions – a problem particularly pronounced for
humans living in separated, competitive groups. However, in
this case the acquired knowledge is implicit and under limited
conscious control. We further propose that it is rational to
honestly and spontaneously internalize the implicit, non-causal
knowledge of people who face similar environmental action-
response contingencies. We also note that these criteria are
approximated by ingroup membership. Further, we propose that
mimicry is an ecologically valid signal of desire for affiliation.
Strategic use of mimicry, we propose, follows straightforwardly
from these assumptions. We elaborate on these points next.
SPONTANEOUS MIMICRY IS FOR
LEARNING
Intentional imitation is considered an important tool for cultural
learning, including learning of instrumental actions (Tomasello
et al., 1993; Gergely and Csibra, 2005; Whiten et al., 2009).
However, note that similar imitative learning mechanism are
also involved in acquisition of implicit bodily activities and
skills, which are often associated with nonverbal mannerisms
and emotion. When such mimicry occurs repeatedly, it leads to
permanent retention of others’ reactions. One classic example
of this is the acquisition of accents. Another is emotional
contagion – “catching” of the others’ somatic and feeling states.
Importantly, note that individuals’ reactions caused by contagion
processes are not typically recognized as being “caused” by the
model, but are viewed as one’s own response to the environment.
This is important because, given individuals’ ignorance of
their external origin, mimicked behaviors and feelings become
privatized in the same way as any sensations (e.g., arousal and
mood) do, when subject to internal (mis)attribution (Schwarz,
2011). For example, when others laugh at a joke, individuals will
too, even though they actually missed the punch line (Provine,
2001). When it is not obvious to individuals that others caused
their mirth, contagious laughter may lead them to decide the joke
is genuinely funnier (Bush et al., 1989). Similarly, evaluations
of a video program converge more when subjects can see their
partner, an effect mediated by levels of mimicry (Ramanathan
and McGill, 2007).
Critically, humans not only adopt others’ emotional displays,
but also others’ postures (Bernieri, 1988). Bodily states can in turn
can influence perception, cognition and motivation (for review,
see Winkielman et al., 2015). For example, participants made to
adopt an upright, as opposed to slumped, posture show greater
task persistence (Riskind and Gotay, 1982) and participants told
to lean forward while looking at a stimulus show neural indicators
of increased desire (Harmon-Jones and Peterson, 2009). In short,
postures, even those externally induced, shape people’s own
beliefs and motivations. Clearly, we are not claiming that adopted
feelings or postures of others are always mis-attributions (i.e.,
maladaptive errors). We are claiming, however, that individuals
can miss that others are the proximate source of their feelings.
Consequently, individuals focus on what “caught” states mean
to them, causing internalization of others’ feelings – an essential
aspect of socialization. Thus, this unawareness is in some sense
“rational”, as it produces adaptive social behavior by utilizing
relatively simple cues to produce the right internal states.
SELECTIVITY OF MIMICRY FOR
LEARNING FROM INGROUPS
But why is spontaneous mimicry preferentially employed within
ingroups? We propose that mimicry entails a potential cost in
terms of acquiring maladaptive behaviors and habits. Specifically,
whereas the habits of ingroup members have survived in a
similar social environment, the habits of outgroup members
have not (Donald, 2005). As this transfer of knowledge from
one individual to another is implicit, there is a risk of polluting
the receiving individuals with bad information that they are
not aware of incorporating. Thus, mimicry should be engaged
more in the presence of prior cues that attendant feelings
constitute “desirable information.” However, this process should
be disengaged when prior cues indicate that it will introduce
“undesirable information” into the cognitive system. In other
words, one can argue that mimicry operates as an implicit
“System 1” process (Evans and Stanovich, 2013) that is moderated
in an ecologically rational fashion (Gigerenzer et al., 2011).
What factors should rationally (adaptively) modify
individuals’ tendency towards mimicry? Humans form groups
around similarities in values and priorities, indicating that
shared feelings are essential to social function (e.g., McPherson
et al., 2001). Humans need to have shared valuations during
collective actions of any kind, from deciding what to eat to how
to punish a crime. Thus, the characteristics that mark someone as
a member of an “ingroup” are much the same as the conditions
under which it is adaptive to share feelings (Cikara et al., 2011).
Ingroup members’ feelings are highly informative of what our
own feelings should be, or would be if we had more experience.
An obvious example is a child’s tendency to become afraid in
response to a parent’s expression of fear. Thus, greater mimicry
should rationally occur when the model is regarded as a good
source of information about proper reactions, and ingroup
membership serves as a good proxy for these criteria. Of course,
as individuals gain experience with complex social environments,
they will learn that some characteristics of others correlate with
the rewards of spontaneous mimicry. Such cues will include
likeability of others, outward markers of ingroup membership,
and their status within the ingroup (e.g., “boss”). High-status
individuals, as “opinion leaders” will likely be more profitably
mimicked by social actors seeking to coordinate feelings with
their group. Sometimes individuals will also implicitly learn that
certain social situations call for complementary, or counter-
mimicry behaviors, such as, for example, smiling submissively
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when a high status individual is frowning (Carr et al., 2014). The
ability to use context to determine whom to mimic and how is
crucial, and reflects on our social competence (Kavanagh et al.,
2011).
Lastly, note that on our account high-fidelity (detailed)
reproduction should be limited to certain contexts. A review
of the facial mimicry literature by Hess and Fischer (2014) is
consistent with this view, arguing that much of what researchers
assumed was mimicry of facial expressions is really about
responding to valenced stimuli. For example, smiles are positive
stimuli, and like all positive stimuli (e.g., candy) individuals
smile in response to them. But this is not mimicry, and in fact
in this case individuals do not reproduce the detailed features
of the observed expressions, just its affective elements. Some
evidence suggests that mimicry involving detailed reproduction
of emotional expressions appears more strongly in situations
where there is joint attention to the same stimulus between
the interactants (Bourgeois and Hess, 2008). On our account,
this makes sense if mimicry is part of learning how to feel
about something from others. Thus, while repetition of other
people’ action and expressions sometimes appears undiscerning,
the implicit mimicry process is likely tuned to learning a deeper
structure of values, reflecting their preferences, goals, and group
affiliations (Carr and Winkielman, 2014).
AFFILIATION AS A SECONDARY
OUTCOME OF MIMICRY: WHY MIMICS
ARE LIKED, BUT ONLY IF SUBTLE AND
APPROXIMATE
We propose that mimicry is advantageous to the mimic because
it facilitates cognitive and affective convergence with the model.
If so, then as an observable action, mimicry is an honest signal to
the model that (i) the sender views the receiver as a good source
from which to learn bodily actions and emotional responses, and
(ii) the sender is motivated to converge in attitudes, choices, and
values. In other words, not only do new individuals benefit from
learning adaptive non-verbal behaviors from ingroup members,
but ingroup members also benefit from new individuals honestly
learning their non-verbal behaviors. Note also that the chances
of a new ingroup member exploiting learned habits for nefarious
goals is limited in an ingroup setting, where joint action and
cooperation is likely. Thus, if socio-cultural learning is the major
reason for mimicry, then models should respond positively to
mimicry, as it signals the likelihood of useful, predictable, high-
quality interactions and joint actions. Thus, mimicry may be the
proximate means by which affiliation is achieved, even though we
may not be aware of mimicry. Nevertheless, the overall dynamic
may be mediated by the contextual variables discussed earlier
(e.g., likeability, or ingroup and social status). It is also plausible
that broad contextual cues similarly drive strategic or at least
goal-dependent mimicry (see Heyes, 2011 for discussion of how
contextual variables could moderate spontaneous imitation).
However, if models respond to mimicry positively by
affiliating with the mimic, then the anticipation of this response
creates incentives to mimic others in order to gain their
affiliation (potentially for Machiavellian purposes) rather than
for acculturation purposes. Therefore, models face the problem
of discriminating true vs. false signals of affiliation. One way
models can solve this problem is by forming an expectation of
the “proper” amount and timing of mimicry. So, if the prior
knowledge about a new individual generates an expectation
of low levels of mimicry, then high levels of mimicry cause
distrust. A related set of cues comes from fidelity, timing and
subtlety. High-fidelity mimicry – very precise reproduction and
timing – arouses suspicion (unless it occurs in entrainment-
like settings, Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009; Manson et al., 2013).
The reason is because such mimicry requires strategic cognition,
possibility directed at temporary goals, rather than implicit
cognition reflecting stable, habitual goals. Note that many
non-verbal behaviors function as genuine signals of internal
states when produced spontaneously (e.g., Duchenne smile and
unbidden laughter), but can also be faked (Boone and Buck, 2003;
Bryant and Aktipis, 2014). Just like spontaneous laughter (ibid),
spontaneous mimicry is more indicative of a true cooperative
disposition than is its deliberate twin. Mimicry behaviors might
be especially informative because they often emerge in the course
of typical social interaction, even when working memory is
loaded (van Leeuwen et al., 2009).
MIMICRY OF INCONSEQUENTIAL
ACTIONS
Finally, readers might wonder how our account explains
why affiliation is produced even by mimicry of seemingly
inconsequential gestures (e.g., leg crossing), or actions produced
by artificial agents. First, the consequentiality of non-verbal
behaviors is generally hard for individuals to assess, partly
because they lack explicit insight into these behaviors (Burgoon
et al., 2010). Second, arbitrariness of a behavior is sometimes
key to its role as a group marker (Legare et al., 2015). Third,
as stated, individuals rely on heuristic, global evaluation of the
usefulness of engaging in mimicry in general, rather than a
comprehensive evaluation of the costs or benefits of a specific
mimicry behavior. Consistently, evidence suggests that overall
imitative tendencies are moderated by global goal states, but
that imitation of specific behaviors is not (Heyes, 2011). Finally,
mimicry of even inconsequential behaviors will still signal to
models that the mimic considers them as good source of implicit
information (which, again, implies the possibility for beneficial
interaction).
CONCLUSION
Mimicry leads to gradual acquisition of imitated behaviors
(gestures, postures, expressions, accents, and mannerisms) and
later reproduction of similar behaviors even in the model’s
absence. This process is principally developmental, with children
learning not only what and who to mimic but also how to mimic,
with their skills becoming more implicit and more attuned to
‘non-verbal’ accents of their ingroup. Throughout, children learn
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expectations for the proper degree and timing, which later allows
for discounting of blatant mimicry. Though the importance
of some mimicked behaviors is hard for the individuals to
establish, we argue that overall this process has symmetrically
positive consequences for both individual socialization and group
function. This is because mimicry entails coordinated affect,
actions or reactions – thus signaling to the model that the mimic
is likely to have, or to develop, the shared values necessary for
sociality. Because mimicry is a valid signal that the mimic is
likely to have beneficial social interactions with the model and
its group, affiliation with the mimic is also adaptive for the
group. The positive reaction and use of this signal is, just like a
smile, complicated by incentives for Machiavellian exploitation.
However, the risk of such exploitation is reduced by the benefits
of selectively incorporating ingroup values as one’s own, the
costs of internalizing maladaptive behaviors and feelings of the
outgroup, and by the presence of spontaneity cues in timing and
fidelity.
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